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Diaspora without Homeland:  
Slave Descendants and the Cultural 
Politics of Ancestry in the Upper 
Gambia River Valley
 Paolo Gaibazzi1
The Gambia is essentially a country of immigrants. Although the Gambia 
River valley has been inhabited for centuries,2 each major phase of its history – 
from the Manding conquest to the Atlantic Slave trade, the expansion of peanut 
cultivation, then colonialism and decolonization – has been marked by robust 
human and commercial mobility. Successive waves of migration have dotted 
the landscape with settlements of different ethnicities, religions and socio-
professional groups. Largely ignored by public debates, this migratory past of 
Gambians thrives in what Pierre Nora (1984) would call milieux de mémoire, a 
social environment where the past is brought to bear on every day and ritual 
life in the present, rather than in lieux de mémoire. Preserved by griots (praise-
singers), oral historians and ordinary people, diasporic memories and genealo-
gies of immigration serve especially to advance claims to customary political 
and religious offices in localities, and to mediate relations and allegiances with 
new settlers and strangers (Beedle, 1980; Bellagamba, 2004).
Not all Gambians have, however, a place in the diasporic memories that 
uphold the social order of the valley. Today, a large number of inhabitants are 
descended from slaves owned by freeborn people in the past. A widespread 
institution, slavery gradually died out after 1930, when the British outlawed all 
forms of ownership and exchange in people.3 However, slave descent has not 
been removed from social memory. With the exception of some groups and 
areas, in most of the Gambia – indeed in most neighbouring countries – descent 
from enslaved people still forms the basis of membership in an endogamous 
status group anachronistically labelled as “slaves” in the local vernaculars. 
1 Research Fellow, Zentrum Moderner Orient, Kirchweg 33, D-14129 Berlin, Germany; 
paolo.gaibazzi@zmo.de
2 These include: some Jola and Manjak speakers in the Lower Valley, some Wolof groups 
on the Northern banks, and some of the Pulaar speaking groups, especially in Middle 
and Upper River.
3 Abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade should not be mistaken for abolition of 
slavery within African territories. Also, various forms of slavery existed in West Africa 




Slave descendants are appended to the bottom of the social hierarchy, which 
is composed of equally endogamous groups of freeborn people topped by 
“nobles” and their client groups of “casted artisans”. In the Gambia, the freeborn 
acknowledge that slave descendants, like themselves, come from elsewhere, but 
they tend to think of them as people with no ancestry.
Slave descendants possibly constitute the largest diasporic group in contem-
porary Gambia, if not in West Africa as a whole.4 Certainly, one should be careful 
not to see people of unfree origins as a homogenous category: West African 
slavery was internally diverse and emancipation produced disparately diverse 
social trajectories (Rossi, 2009). And yet, composite as it may be, this is by far 
the most forgotten diaspora. Stories of the displacement of slaves rarely made it 
into the colonial records, nor were they included in the oral traditions narrated by 
griots and other local oral historians.5 In contrast to the trans-Atlantic slave trade – 
a pacified past preserved in several memorial sites and events that have no impact 
on national politics  – the issue of slavery has not resurfaced in Gambia after 
abolition, except as a metaphor for European exploitation during decolonization 
(Bellagamba, 2009). Indeed, there is virtually no public debate about the history of 
slavery in Gambia and elsewhere in West Africa (Pelckmans and Hohanou, 2012).
The past of Gambian slave descendants is not simply silenced (Trouillot, 
1995); it is also displaced. Whereas many Afro-Americans today think of them-
selves as a diaspora and identify Africa as their ancestral homeland, former 
slaves in West Africa can only be thought of as a diaspora without a homeland.6 
In the Gambia, few people actually have documents or tangible proofs of their 
geographical origins.7 Certifying one’s spatial and social origins is a matter of 
cultural politics, whereby one strives to insert one’s past within accepted frames 
of orally transmitted history (Bellagamba, 2002). Not only have slave descen-
dants poor recollections of their migratory past; their narratives have often 
limited legitimacy and consequentiality in social terms. From the point of view 
of the freeborn, the places of origins of their progenitors are unknown and unve-
rifiable, to the point that remembering who former slaves are implies removing 
their distant origins and placing them at the point and time of their arrival, when 
their genealogical identity as “slaves” was forged.
Based on ethnographic and archival research8 (2006-2008, 2012), this article 
illustrates one aspect of this cultural politics of memory by drawing on the story 
4 It is very hard to quantify the number of slaves. As slavery ended in 1930, they have 
disappeared from the official records. In the Sahel and Senegambia, slaves constituted 
up to 50% of the local population, and the majority stayed after abolition (Klein, 2009).
5 The griots usually assume the viewpoint of the elites. The colonial masters tended to 
reproduce, if at all, this viewpoint (see e.g. Rodet, 2009).
6 Writing about a very different context, Ryang and Lie (2009) have also used the expres-
sion ‘diaspora without homeland’.
7 Some chiefly and clerical (i.e. literate in Arabic) families keep written records (tarika) 
of their genealogies and migrations. In some areas of West Africa, slave descendants 
preserve memories of their place of origin as a means to distinguish themselves from 
the freeborn (Botte, 1994: 115).
8 Research for this article was generously funded by: the University of Milano Bicocca 
with the Unicredit Foundation, Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Missione Etnologica 




of the Kamara, a large, wealthy family living in the Soninke or Serahule village 
of Kunda, in the Upper River Region of the Gambia.9 The Kamara are both typical 
and special slave descendants by West African standards. The scholarship on 
African slavery focuses predominantly on captives and trade slaves. In contrast, 
like many other slave descendants in Upper River communities, the Kamara 
most probably became classified as komo (the Soninke word for slaves/slave 
descendants) once they settled, as free migrants, in Kunda in the late nine-
teenth century, and their children were given women of slave descent to marry. 
The children of such unions would have belonged or become attached to the 
master of the mothers, were it not for the leaders of the family, who used their 
wealth to successfully redeem incoming brides and their children from slave 
status. However, despite having de facto no slave origins, the Kamara are still 
prevented from marrying freeborn women in Kunda because the freeborn think 
that their “true” origins are uncertain and ultimately foreign to the diasporic past 
of the village elites, who descend from the Soninke communities disseminated 
between the upper Senegal River valley and Eastern Mali.
By focusing on the narratives and silences surrounding the origins of the 
Kamara, this article explores the ways in which the memory of migration is 
interlaced with the reproduction of social distinction and inequality (Pelckmans, 
2011: 53-6). Over the past twenty years, there has been a tendency in the social 
sciences to think of diasporic narratives as counter hegemonic discourses that 
disrupt the nationalist myth of blood and soil and/or allow “subaltern subjects” 
to articulate alternative identities and histories (see e.g. Basch, Glick Schiller and 
Szanton Blanc, 1994; Cohen, 1996; Kaplan, 1996). Studies of the African descen-
dants across the Atlantic Ocean and, to some extent, across the Indian Ocean 
and the Sahara, have significantly contributed to such a strand of research, one 
of the most representative works in this scholarship being Paul Gilroy’s (1993) 
The Black Atlantic. However, when transferred to the African continent such pers-
pectives may lack analytical purchase. Not only have memories of the African 
slave trade limited impact on the national politics of the Gambia, but also the 
diasporic memory of continental slave descendants is in itself not anti-hege-
monic, for the dominant discourses on the past are themselves diasporic. For 
the Kamara, becoming truly “local subjects” – subjects who belong to a situated 
community of kin and neighbours (Appadurai, 1996: 179)  – is tantamount to 
claiming not autochthony but membership in a shared history of displacement.10 
I thus suggest that collective memory produces social exclusion not solely 
through a nationalist/sedentarist rhetoric that silences cross-boundary migration 
(Malkki, 1995), but also through eviction from particular diasporic narratives that 
do not acknowledge the migrations of subaltern subjects.
Though silenced and displaced stories like the Kamara’s still raise questions 
about the possibility of narrating history from the point of view of the marginal 
classes. Some scholars have argued that West African slave descendants tend to 
9 In order to protect the identity of the family, I have used a pseudonym for their 
patronym and their village. Excerpts of an interview with Demba Kamara are published 
elsewhere (Gaibazzi, forthcoming-b). This essay is meant to be an analytical commentary 
of this and several other sources.
10 As Carola Lentz (2006: 6) has noted, land rights in West Africa are mostly granted 




have a partial or truncated recollection of the past. Violently uprooted from their 
context of origin often at a young age, and then displaced, sold and assimilated 
into their masters’ milieu, slaves were unable to transmit the oral traditions and 
memories of their homeland to their descendants, who ended up borrowing 
those of their former masters11 (e.g. Klein, 1998: 245; Bruijn and Pelckmans, 
2005: 72). The evidence presented in this article suggests that slave descendants 
may adopt different strategies, from silence to voice, from borrowing to mani-
pulation. After describing the search by the Kamara for their true origins, in the 
second part of the article I proceed to discuss how they contest the geo-social 
location of their origins by appropriating the dominant discourse on ancestry, 
while at the same time reproducing its foundational principles. The Kamara’s 
dispute about ancestry is mostly played out at the conscious or ideological 
level, whereas they rarely call into question the taken-for-granted scripts of the 
memory of migration.12
Far from simply endorsing the argument about the absence of historical 
production among slave descendants (Rodet, 2010), I would nonetheless avoid 
the tendency to conflate the search for subaltern voices with the search for 
alternative, even emancipatory, constructions of the past among slave descen-
dants. As Gyan Prakash has argued, subalternity is not an external element to 
hegemony but an internal one. It identifies an intractability that “erupts within 
the dominant systems and marks its limits from within, that its externality to 
the dominant systems of knowledge and power surfaces inside the system 
of dominance, but only as an intimation, as a trace of that which eludes the 
dominant discourse” (Prakash, 2000: 288, italics in the original). What this article 
does is not so much to try and identify the presence or absence of the subaltern 
voice per se (Spivak, 1988) as to understand how the “subaltern” speaks and 
generates intractable elements within the hegemonic formation. Whereas the 
Kamara do seek emancipation by rectifying diasporic memory, I am especially 
interested in showing how their tribulations with certifying origins bring to the 
surface some of the internal limits and contradictions of the cultural politics of 
ancestry in the Gambia.
Immigration, Slavery and Emancipation in 
Upper River Gambia
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the political map of the 
Senegambia region was redrawn by war. This caused great havoc and displa-
cement in the region. Though it was not free from belligerent warlords, the 
upper Gambia River valley was a relatively safe place to settle; one where, 
moreover, commercial groundnut cultivation was quickly developing. Soninke 
speakers made up a large proportion of the immigrants, and eventually became 
11 For a partial exception to this, see Rodet (2010).
12 Building on Gramsci and R. Williams, John and Jean Comaroff (1992: 29) have distin-
guished between ideology and hegemony, the former being the explicit, argumenta-
tive systems of ideas of a dominant class, and the latter being the naturalized part of 




the largest ethnic group of the Upper River.13 With some exceptions, the first 
waves of Soninke migrants were displaced refugees from Bundu, a pre-colonial 
kingdom between the upper Gambia and the upper Senegal valleys, and one 
of the main theatres of war in the region in the second half of the nineteenth 
century (Gomez, 1992: 122 and 49; Clark, 1999: 99-107). Enjoying a good repu-
tation not only as prominent traders and dedicated Islamic scholars but also as 
arduous cultivators, the displaced Bundu Soninke sought refuge in the commu-
nities of the northern banks, where they had commercial ties, and especially 
founded new villages across the river, along the southward-moving agricultural 
frontier (Gaibazzi, 2010). Here they were granted protection by Aplha Molo Egge, 
and later by his son Musa, the king of Fuladu.14 When the British annexed the 
Upper River to the Protectorate of the Gambia in 1901, most Soninke settlements 
witnessed a change of rulers, but not of rules. Although the colonialists forced 
some political and social changes, power structures remained essentially the 
same, with district and village chiefs, local dignitaries and household heads 
being relied upon to govern the population (Bellagamba, 2002).
Once founded, Soninke villages attracted numerous immigrants hailing from 
the regions of the interior. In spite of colonial pacification, refugees and various 
other migrants continued to arrive in the Upper River valley at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Improved security also favoured labour mobility for burgeo-
ning rural and urban economies. By the 1920s, the Upper River had become 
the first peanut exporting region in the Gambia. Commerce was thriving, Basse 
Santa Su (the regional capital) quickly expanded (Barrett, 1988: 105-106), and 
Soninke villages experienced dramatic demographic growth.15 Thousands of 
so-called strange farmers (called navétanes in Senegal), seasonal migrants, 
came to farm groundnuts in the Gambia.16 Entire families who faced dire 
economic straits in the Upper Senegal valley during the first two decades of the 
twentieth eventually also decided to move into the peanut-growing areas (Rodet, 
2009: 107-121, 248-262). Finally, relatives, fellow villagers and other people 
connected to the Bundu Soninke eventually joined them in their new locations 
along the Upper River valley.
Not all new settlers decided to integrate into the local society. Some probably 
maintained relations with their home communities and married people from 
there. Yet most villagers who are descended from immigrants of the first quarter 
of the twentieth century have cut off relations with their communities of origin. 
Because of either opportunities or constraints, at some point the first settler(s) 
decided to integrate. Since it is not uncommon for African lineages to recruit 
outsiders, within limits, it is likely that some migrants, especially women, were 
“adopted” into local descent groups, thus losing their previous social identities 
and becoming de facto members of the receiving one. Many other strangers 
13 According to the 2003 census the Soninke make up 39% of the citizenry of the Upper 
River Region, followed by Mandinka (31%) and the Fulani (27%) (Republic of The Gambia, 
2006).
14 In its heyday the kingdom of Fuladu (founded in 1861) included most of the 
Casamance, the Southern banks of the Upper Gambia, and parts of Guinea-Bissau.
15 Gambia National Archives CSO 2/1903 (Report on MacCarthy and Upper River 
Provinces for the year 1940).
16 On the strange farmers in the Gambia basin, see Swindell and Jeng (2006). On 
Senegal, see David (1980).
28
Paolo Gaibazzi 
did, in contrast, retain their identity, but as strangers they faced the challenge 
of finding a spouse them and/or their children among people who married 
primarily locals and kin members.
As in many parts of the world, strangers in Kunda were, in Simmel’s (1964 
[1908]) sense, subjects who are in a society, but not part of it. As I showed 
elsewhere (Gaibazzi, 2012), many of those who had neither social connections to 
the villagers nor attributes associated with status groups were lumped together 
with people who already occupied the margins of society: slaves and freedmen. 
Removed from their natal kin, they relied on hosts and patrons, who often played 
a role in arranging marriages with either slaves or former slaves over whom 
they had retained influence. By marrying slave spouses, these immigrants did 
not become the property of their landlords, even though they often depended 
on the latter in times of hardship. Rather, because slave descent is transmitted 
through the mother’s line, the children of such wedlock were classified as slave 
descendants (komo) “belonging” to the master of their mother.
A European reader may find it hard to make sense of why immigrants 
accepted being integrated as “slaves”. Some clarification of the terms employed 
and a historical contextualization of what slavery meant to whom might help. In 
pre-colonial West Africa, there was a continuum between strangerhood and slave 
status. Virtually all definitions of slavery point out that a critical attribute of the 
slave was his or her social anonymity.17 Slaves were first and foremost outsiders 
alienated (often violently) from their own milieus and in their masters’ one, they 
were deprived of their rights of birth over their descendants and ancestors. 
Orlando Patterson (1982) thus equated slavery to social death. Whereas there is 
disagreement on whether slaves were included as members of their masters’ 
society (Kopytoff and Miers, 1977; Meillassoux, 1986), most scholars of African 
slavery agree that slaves shared a condition of strangerhood. It is also docu-
mented that famine, indebtedness and other calamities pushed strangers into 
slavery (e.g. Kopytoff and Miers, 1977: 12; Vaughan, 1977: 92).
In the Upper River, a grey zone between slavery and strangerhood actually 
developed or expanded from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. Peter 
Weil has shown that at this time the rulers and landlords of Wuli, a kingdom 
on the Northern banks of the Upper River, had begun to reduce labour dues 
for slaves because they began to rely on a more flexible workforce, namely the 
strange farmers, who worked four to five mornings (then reduced to three) for 
their landlords, like second generation slaves (Weil, 1984: 109-111). In the Gambia 
and Senegal valleys, slaves who became emancipated also began to enter into 
similar contractual or patron-client relations with former masters and other 
landlords in order to access the land (Manchuelle, 1997: 138-139; Swindell and 
Jeng, 2006: 118-128).
Abolitionist policies deepened the ongoing transformation of slavery. The 
internal trade in slaves was effectively brought to an end by the First World 
War, and all forms of slavery were finally abolished in 1930 (Bellagamba, 2005). 
Abolition was, however, confined to the legal aspects of slavery, and did not 
17 Amongst the first social scientists to point this out was Henri Lévy-Bruhl (1934), who 
in his study on Roman jurisprudence defined slaves as ‘permanent strangers’.
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address the social and economic ones. In the Upper River, the ruling elites 
largely remained in control of political offices and networks of patronage (ibid.: 
27). Some slaves of course took advantage of the legal changes and fled or 
rebelled, but many others remained where they were and tried to become eman-
cipated from their masters by gaining access to the land, building a compound 
for their families, and paying bridewealth either for themselves or for their 
children. This was not an easy task for people who had had limited social and 
economic freedom in the past, and the support of the former masters or of other 
patrons often remained indispensable. As a consequence, although by the 1950s 
social emancipation was virtually complete, many former slaves have since 
maintained ties of actual or customary dependence on their former masters.
In sum, the immigrants who settled in Kunda and the surrounding villages 
from the end of the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century were seen 
neither as captives nor as trade slaves, but as strangers whose social position 
overlapped with that of second generation slaves and freedmen in the period 
of abolition. Nevertheless, by entering into slavery, their descendants have not 
been distinguished from the descendants of slaves proper and today they find 
themselves confined within an endogamous status group anachronistically 
called komo, “slaves”.
The reasons for the ongoing relevance of “slavery” are still being debated 
and concern us only marginally here (see Klein, 2009 for an overview). What 
matters is that a logic of inclusion/exclusion predicated on geo-social origins has 
persisted. The freeborn seem to have responded to the emancipation of slaves 
by monopolizing the means of social distinction and historical production. While 
emancipation allowed slaves to acquire social rights over the descending gene-
rations, thus overcoming social death, it rarely granted them cultural rights over 
the ascending generations. This is also the fate of the immigrants classified and 
integrated into the group of komo. As we shall see, lacking free origins does not 
simply mean that one’s forebears were somebody’s slaves; it also means lacking 
real or mythological ancestors in a distant land. To put it differently, although the 
descendants of slaves are no longer alienable properties, the process of aliena-
tion described by Patterson has continued to haunt them. Slave descendants are 
still separated from their past and remembered as aliens.
In Search of Origins: The Kamara
The Kamara of Kunda village provide an example of the intricacies between 
memory, migration and the reproduction of status boundaries. The Kamara trace 
their origins to one of the waves of migration that reached the Upper River at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Musa Kamara hailed from Southern Central 
Mali, probably from a Pulaar-speaking area. Once he arrived in the Upper 
River, he was hired as a mercenary by Musa Molo Balde, the king of Fuladu 
mentioned earlier. After some years, as a compensation for his services, Musa 
Molo gave Musa Kamara a woman called Penda to marry. As warfare waned 
during colonization, Musa (Kamara) and Penda settled in a recently established 
village, Kunda, in what had by then become a British Protectorate (1901-1965). 
The couple was hosted by a local family, and Musa probably farmed with them 
for a while before he was able to construct his own compound. Musa did not 
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seek other wives in Kunda. Instead he had to find spouses for his children – two 
daughters and a son – when these came of age. Eventually, his two daughters 
married two men of slave descent (kome) and left for their husbands’ villages. 
Not long after, somewhere in the second decade of the twentieth century, Musa 
died, leaving his son Mari and Penda to manage the household on their own.
Surprisingly, the small household managed to make significant progress. 
Mari, known as Mari Penda, was hardworking and enterprising. For a number 
of seasons, he managed to harvest a surplus of groundnuts and sell them. He 
did not sit on his money: he travelled through the Kayes area (in Mali) or to Futa 
Jallon (in today’s Guinea) together with other Soninke and Gambian traders, and 
returned with textiles, which he then resold in the lower Gambia valley. In turn, 
Mari Penda used his profits to employ strange farmers and pay people in kind 
in order to help him with weeding and harvesting the fields. He went on trading 
and farming until the 1930s, when he began to do business at home. He mainly 
invested in cattle breeding and in buying and selling groundnuts.
Mari Penda became a patron in his village. Today, some fifty years after 
his death, many elders still have vivid memories of him. He is remembered 
as a wealthy and generous man who often gave oxen from his large herd as 
a gesture of Islamic charity. He sometimes wrote off the debts of people who 
had borrowed money from him or bought his produce on credit, and helped the 
needy. Mari Penda also befriended Islamic scholars, whose spiritual and esoteric 
assistance he probably sought in order to ensure the protection and prosperity 
of his family. In the 1950s, he was among the first people in the Upper River area 
to travel on a plane to Mecca, together with the district chief at that time.
Mari Penda’s upward mobility was, however, partial. He was able to marry 
off some of his daughters to well-known clerical families. Yet neither he nor his 
sons have ever been able to marry freeborn women. Mari Penda married four 
wives, three of kome descent from Kunda and nearby villages, and one from 
Mali whom he purportedly found through his commercial partners. Except 
for his “foreign” wife, Mari Penda was, like his father, thus positioned among 
the komo through marriage. Ever since Mari Penda took his first wife from his 
affines (his sister’s marital kin), the Kamara have manumitted their brides from 
the latter’s former masters.18 Though abolition gave them legal freedom, former 
slaves wishing to redeem themselves from socio-moral obligations vis-à-vis 
their former masters are still required to advance a request to the latter together 
with a symbolic payment or present. Once redeemed and purified, the Kamara 
brides would not transmit slave descent to their children. “None of our women 
cook at ceremonies”, a Kamara elder said to me once, thus making it clear that 
the Kamara owe ritual labour to nobody, in contrast to most other komo.19
More than any other family I have met in the Upper River, the Kamara epito-
mised the painstaking effort by people classified as slave descendants to move 
out of their status group. Their fellow villagers of all statuses partly acknowledged 
18 This is commonly done by freeborn men who marry women of slave descent. 
Freeborn women are not allowed to marry down the social hierarchy.




the upward mobility of the Kamara: “Nobody can call them slaves!” they often 
told me, emphatically lowering their voices and putting a hand in front of their 
mouths, as if to warn me that such comments should not be voiced freely. 
Nobody could say that any of the Kamara, dead or alive, was “our slave”, or that 
“we got him a wife”, as members of the freeborn are sometimes heard to say 
when speaking of the descendants of their former slaves. This shows that, thanks 
to their achievements and wide-ranging patronage networks, the Kamara could 
to some extent silence attempts to publicly shame them by mentioning their lack 
of freeborn origin. And yet, if respect and caution were used in talking about 
the Kamara’s status, at the social and practical level they were not considered 
by any means as freeborn. When I put it to a young man of an important noble 
lineage that “the Kamara are not slaves”, he plainly retorted: “Do you see any 
noble woman in that compound?” I had to admit I did not.
The status of the Kamara is a veritable conundrum: since the Kamara are 
nobody’s former slaves, on what basis are they associated with the komo, and 
thus denied freeborn women? Where does their slave descent originate from? 
In considering the social origins of the Kamara, the majority of my respondents 
questioned on such issue proceeded matrilineally, as for most slave descen-
dants. Many of them, like my acquaintance, did not know the details of the entry 
of the Kamara into “slavery” and simply assumed that Mari Penda’s father, or 
some earlier ancestor of his, married a slave woman when he settled in Kunda. 
The absence of noble women in their compound was, in their view, a self-
evident result of that. Yet this version lacked authority, for the reasons mentioned 
above: no genealogies of slave descent could be found in the Kamara’s past. 
Thus, some of the more aged and knowledgeable freeborn in Kunda supported 
their arguments by pointing to the marriage between Musa and Penda. They 
remarked that Penda was a slave or a slave descendant from Musa Molo’s large 
entourage of servants; even if she had been Musa Molo’s own daughter, as the 
Kamara claimed, the king of Fuladu himself was known to have slave origins in 
spite of his military achievements.20 Needless to say, the Kamara retorted that 
Penda was a member of a royal family, and that Musa’s marriage had nothing to 
do with slave-master relations.
In reckoning status origins, some of the village elders, including many slave 
descendants, focused instead on the patrilineage of the Kamara. Even before 
abolition, slaves who were redeemed by, or who redeemed themselves from 
their masters, would earn rights over their children and were able to found their 
own lineages. Although former masters have often retained some rights and 
influence over the labour of their former slave women’s children after abolition, 
they have not contested the legitimacy and autonomy of kome patrilineages.21 
This has certainly prompted slave descendants to honour the memory of their 
ancestors as required by the dominant, patriarchal logic; hence the Kamara’s 
emphasis on their patrilineage. A corollary of this has been the consolidation 
of a discourse on the origins of the male founder(s) of the family, who in the 
20 The Balde, Musa Molo’s descent group, did (and do) adopt an open marriage and assi-
milation policy whereby people of different statuses including slaves could be integrated 
as family members.
21 It is likely that Islamization, which increased during the twentieth century, further 
contributed to the transition to a patrilineal and patriarchal kinship.
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case of Kunda families corresponds to the person who first settled in the village 
(see also below). Nobody in Kunda was alleged to have owned Musa Kamara, 
though an aged noble woman reported rumours that Musa Kamara was a slave 
of a Malian chief, and that Mari Penda once travelled to Mali and presented that 
chiefly family with a large wad of banknotes in order to undo the socio-moral 
bondage that had “tied” his father to his master.22 I did not probe the Kamara 
with this version of the facts. I am, however, positive that they would have 
vehemently rejected it. The Kamara elders were sanguine about the fact that 
Musa was a nobleman, and not a destitute person, in Mali. Their father – Mari 
Penda – had told them that Musa had a noble patronym,23 but that the village 
elites did not trust him because he did not have a good Islamic education like 
clerical members of the various Kamara clans living in Kunda and surrounding 
villages.24 He could not obtain a noble wife for his son because, as one of them 
said: “if the villagers don’t know where you’re from, they’ll give you a slave 
woman”. According to his sons, Mari Penda resented this discrimination against 
his father. As his marriage strategies show, he firmly believed in his nobility, or 
at least aspired to it, and thus tried to “keep slavery out of the family”. He did 
not, however, openly confront the nobles; having grown wealthy and renowned, 
he tried not to overstep his boundaries. “He satisfied himself with redeemed 
slaves”, as Demba, the head of the Kamara family in 2008, reported.
On the available evidence, it is difficult to ascertain whether Musa was a 
nobleman. Some noble elders in Kunda conceded that he might have been one, 
but then neutralised the Kamara’s claims to nobility by cynically observing that 
Musa and his children married slave women. My own interpretation of the story 
is that, rather than a one-off event like the acceptance of a slave woman, the 
integration of Musa Kamara among slave descendants took place progressively. 
What situated Musa and his family among the komo was probably his inability/
unwillingness to marry outside that group, and to forge marriage alliances with 
Penda’s kin (matrilateral cross-cousin marriage being a preferred practice in 
this part of the world). More than Musa’s own marriage, the turning point was 
perhaps the marriage of his daughters to the kome families of Kunda and a 
nearby village respectively. Mari Penda subsequently received a bride from one 
such family.
However, my hypothesis of the gradual process of integration is an analytical 
version of the events, not the local one. Local memory is replete with different 
versions, speculations and sometimes puzzles about the “true origins” of the 
Kamara. Having purified their descent group from traces of slavery, the identity 
of the Kamara as slave descendants fundamentally rests on establishing the 
origin of their ancestors, Musa and Penda. This is where the Kamara were 
particularly determined to pursue their cause. If the noble origins of Musa were 
22 This vicissitude, which was reported by another villager too, is not entirely clear. It is 
uncertain why Mari Penda would be attached to his father’s master (father’s line). One 
might speculate that Mari Penda wished to honour his father by redeeming him from 
bondage.
23 I chose the pseudonym Kamara precisely because, like the original name, it can be 
a noble patronym among Mande groups, including the Soninke. Soninke speakers who 
bear a non-Soninke patronym are likely to be slave descendants.
24 At the time, Islamization was still partial, and advanced Islamic education was a prero-
gative of the nobles, especially the clerics (moodinu).
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ascertained, there would be no reason to refuse their sons a freeborn woman. As 
we shall see, this compelled them to go further back in time and space in order 
to reconstruct the route followed by Musa, which villagers removed or glossed 
as a condition of strangerhood, even of slavery.
For most slave descendants, the claim that “my father was not a slave” is a 
toothless statement because pre-immigration genealogies and places of origins 
are usually forgotten. This is not solely because memories of places that most 
descendants of strangers like Musa Kamara never visited inevitably fade. It is 
also because the routes of migration are not paved on the cultural terrain of 
collective memory, and the places “where they come from” are not enshrined 
in the geography of ancestral homes narrated by oral historians. In order to 
understand the struggle for recognition of the Kamara it is therefore necessary 
to understand how diasporic memory is produced and appropriated by Kunda 
villagers.
Routing Roots: Ancestral Migrations and the 
Production of Incommensurable Otherness
With some exceptions, Soninke villages, including Kunda, were founded four 
to five generations ago. This roughly corresponds to the depth of genealogical 
memory among the Soninke. Villagers remember who the first settler of a given 
family was, and recollect the descendants he/she begot thereafter, but have 
little knowledge of previous kinship relations. Pre-immigration genealogical 
memories are extremely fuzzy, almost non-existent, even among more recent 
immigrants. Prior to the exodus, Bundu villages laid in a commercial corridor of 
the Upper Senegal and Gambia River Valleys. These communities had extensive 
linkages with the wider Soninke diaspora (Curtin, 1975: 68) which certainly 
played a role in the integration of relatives and other Soninke speakers moving 
to the newly founded villages in the Upper River during the first decades of the 
twentieth century. Progressively, however, social ties with the Eastern diaspora 
thinned out. Most of the genealogies that I collected among the freeborn 
contained few marriages with the East. Villagers mostly married local people.
It would be inaccurate to say that people in Kunda have forgotten their 
kin relations with Eastern communities. They have rather turned them into 
ancestral memories. At a broad, ethno-linguistic level, Upper River Soninke 
sometimes describe themselves as a specific branch of the Soninke diaspora 
called Kambianko (Gambian Soninke). When I asked my informants to tell me 
the history either of their village or of the Kambia Soninke, Bundu was the most 
frequently cited point of departure. Kunda villagers attributed displacement to 
King Bokar Saada Sy (1855-1885). Wars, hardship and persecution during his rule 
forced people to uproot themselves and descend to the Gambia valley. Some 
villages in the Upper River were eventually named after the Bundu villages, and 
are still governed by the same families.25
However documented in historical terms, the emphasis on displacement 
from Bundu must be understood in the light of the myth of origin of the Soninke. 
25 Among others: Sabi, Numuyell and Julangel.
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Soninke speakers often refer to displacement in Bundu as Kanta kare, literally 
“Kanta is ruined”. Kanta is thought to be located near Kumbi Saleh, the capital 
of the medieval Empire of Ghana or Wagadu (Eastern Mali) (seventh-twelfth 
century), and widely acknowledged to be the ancestral homeland of the Soninke 
diaspora. According to the myth (Meillassoux, Doucouré and Simagha, 1967), a 
snake (biida) bestowed gold on Wagadu (probably a symbol of the riches of the 
Medieval trans-Saharan trade with the Arabs). As the legend goes, the snake was 
killed by a young man whose beloved girlfriend had been offered as a sacrificial 
gift to the mythical monster. The sinful murder brought havoc to Wagadu, forcing 
people to disperse. This is the exodus that generated the Soninke diaspora as we 
know it today, with people stationing in certain areas for short or long periods, 
before moving on again. Though they differed considerably from one another in 
the amount of detail they could offer, many interlocutors, irrespectively of their 
age, gender and status, knew this legend and held it as a sort of cultural heritage. 
Indeed, when I asked about such events of the remote past (ganni), I was encou-
raged to visit griots,26 or people knowledgeable enough to detail the chain of 
emplacements and exoduses that led the Soninke, throughout the centuries, to 
settle in their present locations (these experts included slave descendants). Note 
that whereas in Western thought “place is one the most evocative and powerful 
imaginary aids for the artifices of memory: locus” (Creet, 2011: 8, italics in the 
original), Soninke diasporic memory also highlights movement and routes. That 
is to say, the Soninke convey a sense of historical continuity by linking “actual” 
to “ancestral” migrations, thus creating a sense of a shared destiny of alternate 
emplacement and dispersal. Actual recollection dissolves into oral tradition, and 
chronology is telescoped in favour of experiential continuity.
The ancestral memory of single descent groups or xabilanu operates in a 
similar way. Many families migrated from Bundu along with the founders of 
Soninke villages, or some time later, and thus belong in the history of the founda-
tion of such villages. They can appropriate the history of dispersal as a history of 
their own making. Other freeborn families came to Kunda from different regions 
or have different trajectories of immigration. They do not feature in the most 
recent history of exodus from Bundu and the subsequent foundation of villages 
in the Upper River (which is manifested in their subordinate position vis-à-vis 
the chiefs and the founders), but they may still be regarded as having common 
ancestry with the village founders in a more distant time-space.27 The skilful 
griot is able to describe the legendary ancestors and the tradition (laada) linked 
to a patronym. He or she also associates patronyms with prominent dynasties 
in lands to the east of Gambia, usually in Mali. For example, a well-known 
griot told me that the Dukure of Gambisara, the village chiefs, never settled in 
Bundu; they came directly from a branch of the royal family of Jafunu, in South 
Western Mali. Another oral historian told me that the chiefly lineage of Kumbija, 
the Jawara, belonged to the royal family of nearby Kingi, then migrated to 
Bundu, and eventually descended to the Gambia. The Jawara of Sabi also claim 
to have come directly from Kingi, but belonged to clerical lineages (moodinu) 
26 There are two types of griots among the Soninke. The jaaru (praise singers) can be 
of different statuses, usually leatherworkers (garanke). The geseru, oral historians and 
custodians of genealogies (of nobles), form a separate status group.
27 This mode of reconstructing immigration and settlement is deep-seated and wides-
pread among Soninke communities (Pollet and Winter, 1971: 44-62).
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of the patronym. In addition, customary relations between patronyms, such as 
the joking relationship (kallungora) between families of different status groups, 
might be represented as an ancient tradition that has bound families since 
the time of Wagadu or some other place along the route.28 In short, a freeborn 
patronym is usually endowed with cultural capital fundamentally constructed 
around the idea of ancestry, as well as with social capital that locates a member 
of a xabila within the social landscape by means of customary relations. Once 
again, this modality of memory is implicitly diasporic, for it locates the origins of 
a given patronym almost invariably to the east of Gambia, closer to the mythical 
homeland of Wagadu, and often within a narrative of stepwise exodus from it. 
Descent is thus as much about territory and mobility as it is about blood.
Finally, in Soninke villages, there are families that have different ancestral 
roots and routes altogether but who still intermarry with the freeborn. Although 
some of them were not Soninke by origin, thanks to kinship ties and certified 
status origins they were eventually able to become assimilated as Soninke 
freeborn.29 A few have even managed to retain their ethno-cultural distinctive-
ness. For instance, one of the most prestigious Quranic schools in Sabi is run by 
a Jaxanke (or Jakhanke) whose father immigrated to the village at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. This man was an Islamic scholar who, according to 
today’s elders, had no relatives in Sabi. It was thanks to his scholarly credentials 
that Suware could pass as a noble despite being a stranger. He successfully 
obtained a spouse from the Kaba, a noble and clerical family featuring amongst 
the founders of the village. This marriage was thus an act of recognition of his 
social and geographical roots. Today, nobody in Sabi doubts that Suware came 
from a noble and clerical family in Tanda, a precolonial kingdom in South Eastern 
Senegal. While the Suware have been able to maintain their ethnic distinctive-
ness and facilitated the settlement of other Jaxanke families in Sabi, their destiny 
is now united with that of noble Sabinko by multiple matrimonial alliances.
To summarise this far, claiming membership in a particular status group is 
claiming origins in a past remembered as both roots and routes. While, on the 
one hand, the freeborn have forgotten their pre-immigration genealogies, on 
the other, their linkages (actual or putative) with Eastern communities are still 
remembered as descent, both in the genealogical sense and in the spatial sense 
of having descended from Soninke homelands to the Gambia valley. Routes and 
roots that fall outside the main narratives of the Soninke diaspora may also be 
acknowledged, provided that there are ways of establishing connections with 
Soninke freeborn and/or of certifying them.
A corollary of this mode of reconstructing past mobility is that slave descen-
dants are denied ancestry. Even for immigrants like Musa Kamara who were 
not enslaved by Kunda people, foreign origins are reduced to undifferentiated 
and incommensurable otherness. This is the essence of the sentence “if they 
don’t know where you come from [socially and geographically], they’ll give you 
28 Pollet and Winter (1971: 58) remark that in Jafanu, royal families and the first settlers 
bestowed particular laada on noble latecomers as a way of weaving allegiances with 
them.
29 For example, some branches of the Kaba of Sabi and Sandaga were originally 




a slave woman”. In contrast to actual slaves, becoming classified as a “slave” 
did not imply a complete depersonalization. Immigrants were able to preserve 
their patronym and founded their households and lineages.30 Unlike the Jaxanke 
scholar in Sabi, however, many immigrants did not have the attributes of 
freeborn status and could not preserve their alterity while being integrated into 
the host community. The Kamara thus rationalize their inclusion in the komo as 
the lack of Islamic education. By having “chosen” to integrate into the village as 
komo, their ancestry was removed and eventually excluded from the heritage 
of migration. As some freeborn informants conceded: “[Musa Kamara] was a 
nobleman, but then he married a slave woman”.
Appropriating and Reproducing Diasporic Memory
The Kamara defy the dominant discourse on the incommensurable otherness 
of immigrants ranked as slaves. Having redeemed their genealogy from slavery, 
their quest for recognition is an attempt to resist the removal of their ancestry 
and to reinscribe it into the Soninke oral tradition of ancestral migrations. This 
strategy emerged clearly during my first interview with Demba, the oldest man 
of the Kamara in 2008, who was known as a good historian in Kunda. Before I 
started recording him, I explained that I had come to see him because I was told 
he was knowledgeable about the past, and because I was also interested in the 
history of his family. It was no surprise that Demba began his narration from 
the distant past (ganni), and proceeded by interweaving the migration of his 
family with that of the Gambian Soninke. Although there is little doubt that the 
interview setting as well as my requests influenced him, the way he inscribed 
the story of the Kamara in the dominant narrative of diaspora reveals clearly 
both the cultural politics of memory and the attempts of those excluded from it 
to manipulate it:
[My ancestors arrived here] step by step. They left Segu [Central Mali] and went to 
Wagadu – they stayed long in Wagadu. When Wagadu was no good any more, they left 
Wagadu and went to Kanta. When Kanta was ruined, our forebears met in the bush, and 
asked each other: “How is it over there?”. They replied “Over there is destroyed”. That is 
why the Soninke say “Kanta kare” to mean something disastrous happened. When they 
left Segu, they came to Bundu. Their stay in Bundu lasted long till war reached them. In 
Bundu, they scattered, and some went to Tambacounda [Senegalese city near the eastern 
border of the Gambia]. In Tamba, they scattered again […and came to the Gambia].
Later in the interview, Demba nuanced this story and changed the migratory 
paths slightly, while insisting on the unfair discrimination that his family suffered 
in Kunda. He countered the villagers’ matrimonial policy on the basis of a putati-
vely shared ancestry with the Soninke freeborn. Even if, by so doing, he hinted at 
the fact that the Kamara might have been of a different ethnicity, he stressed that 
the sharing of routes and emplacements in the past should stand as evidence 
that Musa Kamara was no stranger:
30 In some parts of the region, slaves adopted their masters’ patronym, even though 
freeborn and slave lineages were kept separate.
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This village is deceptive. If they don’t know you, if you come and just stay once, they 
will say “give him a slave woman”. Since they don’t know where you come from… there 
are many freeborn [turned slaves] in this village. They will say to them “those are kome”. 
If they don’t understand your place of origin, it won’t work. However, the place where 
our Soninko [i.e. Soninke nobles] come from – Loni31 – is the place where we used to be 
together. We left Loni, we went to Kayes32 [south-western Mali]. We and the Fulani [Pulaar 
speakers] established strong ties. The Fulani and our sisters married over there […]. In 
that time, the Soninko and us left Loni...
In his narration, Demba resists categorization by the dominant classes, but he 
does so not so much by opposing the way origins are reckoned, as by disputing 
the outcome of such reckoning. He does not dismiss the dominant mode of 
remembering home and migration; but rather he manipulates it. This allows 
him to insert his family history into the migratory history and heritage of the 
Soninke, thus claiming full citizenship in their society. This is not mere rhetoric 
fed to the ethnographer. It is remarkable that, in an attempt to certify the high 
status of their grandfather, Demba and another member of his family paid visits 
to Musa Kamara’s purported place of origin. On separate occasions, while they 
travelled overland to reach other countries in West Africa, they visited some 
villages located at some distance from Bamako. They spoke to the elders of the 
villages, and even though they could not establish exact genealogical links, they 
reportedly had confirmation that Kamara is a noble patronym in the region.
Unfortunately, however hard they try to reconstruct their ancestry in geogra-
phical and social space; the Kamara’s alternative memories have limited social 
currency in Kunda. It seemed that a number of villagers of all statuses were 
familiar with the story of the Kamara as narrated by them, a sign that I was not 
the only one they had tried to persuade of their noble ancestry. At the same time, 
there was no sign that Demba or his brothers overtly campaigned for a different 
history on public occasions. To be sure, griots can manipulate the past in order 
to please their patrons. Although I was unable to attend a ceremony at the 
Kamara compound, griots would hardly miss the opportunity to sing and praise 
the patronym of this prominent family. In a different village, I once heard a griot 
addressing a kome woman by the surname of Kamara (an unrelated lineage 
to the above) during a wedding ceremony. The griot proclaimed that “Kamara 
are not komo!”, and proceeded to narrate the epics of a royal Kamara family 
of Mali and Mauritania. Such praising of names, comprehensive of diasporic 
ancestry, did not of course turn the woman, who was in fact cooking for her 
former mistress, into a noble. Were her family to look for a marriageable partner 
for her son, such versions of the past would have no credibility. Genealogies, 
which are widely known and are much less malleable than mythical pasts, would 
be used to locate her in the social landscape, and if needed at all, the more 
“official” versions of ancestral history that I described above would be mobilised 
in support of certain claims of status. Likewise, in social domains like marriage 
allegiances, the Kamara’s versions of the past still lack legitimacy.
31 I could not locate Loni on available maps. Demba probably referred to a location in 
Central Mali.
32 Note that this is where Mari Penda had strong commercial connections.
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Finally, even though describing the political economy that upholds this mode 
of memory production is beyond the scope of this essay, let me mention again 
that the narratives of immigration and genealogies of diasporic ancestry which 
regulate marriage relations are also central to the reproduction of the socio-
political order. This makes them difficult to manipulate. Since the foundations of 
communities, such memories have been part and parcel of the ideological appa-
ratuses of the freeborn ruling classes. By relying on existing forms of power, 
the colonial and postcolonial states have indirectly contributed to reproducing 
and reifying such narratives of the past. To mention but one example, the noble 
family (or families) that founded or conquered a village usually enjoy a right 
of inheritance over village chieftaincy. Despite austerity measures imposed by 
neoliberal international agencies having curtailed the resources that can be fed 
into such forms of state patronage, the current regime in the Gambia still requires 
the village elites to ensure governance at the local level and to channel votes to 
the ruling party (Bellagamba and Gaibazzi, 2008). Last but not least, high rates of 
emigration to foreign countries in the Upper River have only partially eroded the 
significance of status boundaries. Soninke communities have maintained strong 
transnational and translocal solidarities, in which group membership, and the 
normative predicaments of status origins that go with it, are important, if not 
enforced, in the everyday life of the migrants (Sy, 2000; Gaibazzi, forthcoming-a).
Concluding Remarks: From Untraceable Past to 
Intractable Present
Exploring the intricacies of mobility and status in a Gambian Soninke village, 
this article has shown that diasporic memory may sustain social hierarchies 
rather than bring emancipation from them. In this milieu, the memory of past 
migration crystallizes not only movements between geographical locations, but 
also those between social positions. For a number of villagers, the integration 
of their immigrant forebears in the village is remembered as an event, rather 
than as a process, centred on the marriage between them (or their children) and 
slave women. Remembering the point of arrival and integration is not merely 
the result of displacement. Displacement has affected most of the Soninke 
who moved from Eastern Senegal and Mali to the Upper River and founded 
new villages in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, many immigrants who 
settled in these villages and later became “slaves” were not necessarily forced 
migrants but people in search of economic opportunities. Today the descendants 
of both groups have only truncated genealogies and a poor recollection of their 
pre-migratory past. Yet the freeborn memorialize displacement within a series 
of historical and mythical exoduses that constitute the Soninke as an imagined 
community of descent and destiny. Some immigrants who have integrated as 
freeborn in Kunda and other Soninke villages are allowed to become part of 
this community of destiny even though they do not share the same descent. 
The descendants of immigrants integrated as komo are also Soninke ethnics 
today, and will remain such tomorrow, but they are aliened from their ancestors 
and ancestral homes. Their status as strangers is frozen: in a way, the sons and 
grandsons of such immigrants still marry “slave women” because the freeborn 
still “don’t [want to] know where they came from”.
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Slave descendants do not simply forget their forebears. As a work of power, 
diasporic memory in the Soninke milieu interrupts the routing of roots of 
immigrant strangers, placing their descendants among the people who have 
no ancestry. Slave descendants have no or little room to commemorate their 
routes and to cherish their places of origins, and are thus forced to borrow 
narratives and rely on the very same means of cultural production (e.g. griots) 
through which the freeborn articulate their visions of history. At the same time, 
they may actively manipulate the dominant historical canon in order to claim 
cultural citizenship in their community and/or to contest the expunction of their 
ancestors from social memory.
There are not, however, two opposing camps of freeborn and slave descen-
dants, but a unique, plural and uneven field of memory production through 
which status identities are crafted and disputed. Within this field, subaltern 
voices – in this case, the alternative recollection and signification of the past – do 
not necessarily emerge as a deviation or rupture of hegemonic articulation, but 
as what Gyan Prakash (2000: 288) has called an intractability surfacing within the 
dominant discourse. The Kamara of Kunda embody this intractable presence in 
the social memory of Kunda migrations. For most slave descendants, marriages 
among the komo stand as self-evident proof of their status, regardless of their 
actual origins: “he was a noble, but then he married a slave woman”. Having 
removed traces of servility and obligations to any former masters, the certi-
fication of the origins of the Kamara rests fundamentally on establishing the 
validity of claims to freeborn origins. The Kamara’s version of their diasporic 
past shifts attention away from slave descent (especially matrilineal descent), 
and produces a dignified, “pure”, ancestry in a faraway homeland. By insisting 
on finding their roots, the Kamara reproduce, on the one hand, the discourse on 
ancestry which excludes them, while on the other they reveal the arbitrariness 
of such discourse on certifiable origins, ultimately unveiling the violent, ambiva-
lent nature of slave descent as a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this way, the Kamara 
stretch the boundary of status to its limits, and even straddle it, but cannot, as 
yet, transcend it. For their fellow villagers, they remain well-known strangers, 
external insiders, purified impure, slaves whom nobody can call slaves.
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 Diaspora without Homeland:  
Slave Descendants and the Cultural Politics 
of Ancestry in the Upper Gambia River Valley
This article investigates how memories of migration are used to maintain the status 
boundary between people of freeborn and slave descent in the Gambia. Based on 
ethnographic and historical research among the Soninke communities of the Upper 
River Region, the article shows that forgetting the roots and routes of slave descen-
dants has been central to forging and remembering their servile status. While all 
villagers have foreign origins, slave descendants are stigmatized for lacking certified 
ancestry. Unlike the freeborn, they cannot inscribe their homelands and diasporic 
journeys in the local oral traditions and genealogies of immigration. By drawing on 
the case study of a family, the article also shows that slave descendants may dispute 
this collective amnesia and discusses the possibilities and limits of subaltern narra-
tives vis-à-vis the hegemonic production of the past.
 Une diaspora sans patrie :  
descendants d’esclaves et politique culturelle 
de l’ascendance dans la haute vallée du fleuve Gambie
Cet article examine comment la mémoire de la migration est utilisée pour maintenir 
les frontières entre statuts sociaux en Gambie, notamment entre les personnes de 
condition libre et les descendants d’esclaves. Basé sur des recherches ethnogra-
phiques et historiques parmi les communautés soninkés de la région de l’Upper River, 
l’article montre que l’oubli des origines et des parcours migratoires des descendants 
d’esclaves participe à la reproduction de leur condition servile. Bien que tous les villa-
geois aient des origines étrangères, les descendants d’esclaves restent stigmatisés du 
fait de leur généalogie « inexistante ». Contrairement aux personnes de statut libre, ils 
ne peuvent pas inscrire localement leur histoire diasporique dans les traditions orales 
ni dans les généalogies de l’immigration. En s’appuyant sur l’étude de cas d’une 
famille d’origine servile, l’article montre également que les descendants d’esclaves 
peuvent contester cette amnésie. Nous examinons notamment les possibilités et les 
limites des récits « subalternes » vis-à-vis de la production hégémonique du passé.
 Una diáspora sin patria:  
los descendientes de esclavos y las políticas 
culturales de ascendencia en el Alto Valle del río Gambia
Este artículo describe cómo la memoria de la migración se utiliza para mantener la 
frontera entre los descendientes de los nacidos libres y los descendientes de esclavos 
en Gambia. Apoyándose en una investigación etnográfica e histórica de comunidades 
Soninke de la Región Alta del Río Gambia, el artículo muestra que el olvido de las 
raíces y las rutas de los descendientes de esclavos ha sido fundamental en la repro-
ducción de su condición servil. Mientras que todos los habitantes de las comunidades 
Soninke son de origen extranjero, los descendientes de esclavos son estigmatizados 
por su falta de una ascendencia certificada. A diferencia de los nacidos libres, estos 
no pueden inscribir ni su país de origen ni su recorrido por la diáspora dentro de las 
tradiciones orales locales y sus genealogías de la inmigración. Mediante la historia de 
una familia, el artículo también muestra que los descendientes de esclavos pueden 
desafiar esta amnesia colectiva, y analiza las posibilidades y límites de las narrativas 
subalternas en relación a la producción hegemónica del pasado.
